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The Instatement of the Vernacular as Language 
of Culture
A New Aristotelian Paradigm in Sixteenth-Century Italy
di Marco Sgarbi
1. The «questione della lingua»
The purpose of this study is to look at the instatement of the 
vernacular as a «language of culture» from a strictly philosophical 
standpoint, in other words to examine the various philosophical 
approaches that might have affected the genesis of certain linguistic 
theories and determined the adoption of specific features of a given 
language. 
By «language of culture» I mean a language that is used to trans-
mit any form of knowledge and is not restricted to any specific liter-
ary genre or area of interest. Framing the matter in this way makes 
the assertion that the vernacular became a language of culture only 
during the Renaissance, in the Cinquecento in particular, is shared 
by almost all scholars. Of course, the vernacular had already left its 
mark as a literary language with the so-called Tre Corone (Dante, Pe-
trarch, and Boccaccio), as well as beyond the confines of poetry with 
Dante’s Convivio or Boccaccio’s Decameron. But its use remained 
highly restricted1. More importantly, in a century that has been de-
For citations from works published between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries I follow the 
numbering used by the authors themselves. My general rule has been to preserve original spelling 
and punctuation except where the best editions happen to be in modernized form. When not 
signaled, the translations are mine. I gratefully acknowledge the help and suggestions of Alessio 
Cotugno, Clorinda Donato, Bernard Huß, Laura Refe, Mirko Tavoni and Lorenzo Tomasin, and 
of the anonymous referees during the writing of this paper. This research has been possible thanks 
to the ERC Strarting Grant 2013, n. 335949, «Aristotle in the Italian Vernacular: Rethinking 
Renaissance and Early-Modern Intellectual History (c. 1400 – c. 1650)», http://aristotleinthe 
vernacular.org.
1 On the sporadic use of vernacular in science and philosophy before the Cinquecento, 
see the papers collected in the following volumes: Filosofia in volgare nel Medioevo, Turnhout, 
Brepols, 2003; Lo scaffale della biblioteca scientifica in volgare (secc. XIII-XVI), Florence, Sismel, 
2006; Thinking Politics in the Vernacular from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, Fribourg, 
Fribourg Academic Press, 2011.
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fined as the «long fifteenth century»2, the vernacular went through a 
marked downturn in theoretical and literary output which has been 
referred to as an «elimination of the autonomy and very existence of 
the vernacular by the humanists»3. Needless to say, the same period 
also produced some notable exceptions such as Leon Battista Alberti, 
Lorenzo the Magnificent, and Cristoforo Landino. 
It was only with the end of the Quattrocento and the invention 
of the printing press that the vernacular made a definitive comeback 
in the cultural panorama of the Italian Renaissance. Although oral 
and manuscript culture continued to thrive, the rise and spread of 
printing was a key development that revolutionized the way culture 
was consumed at the turn of the century, no doubt serving also 
as a catalyst, if not the single most important catalyst, that led to 
the establishment of the vernacular in Italy. Even so, in the age of 
the incunabula and the early years of the Cinquecento the output 
of printed works in the vernacular remained very limited, as many 
printers were still unwilling to include works that were not written 
in Latin in their catalogues. This was the case not only in Italy, 
arguably the cradle of humanism, but also across Europe4, and it 
went hand-in-hand with the gradual spread of literacy in a growing 
cross-section of society. 
The political unrest that followed the death of Lorenzo the Mag-
nificent continued until the Sack of Rome in 1527, leading to the 
disempowerment of the courtly system and resulting indirectly in 
the vernacular becoming the language of culture in Italy later than 
elsewhere in Europe and at a time of acute national upheaval. Not 
until the 1540s, in fact, did the vernacular begin to come into its 
own. Aldo Manuzio’s printing house in Venice, for instance, per-
haps the most renowned printing house in Italy, if not Europe, also 
for vernacular literature, until 1529 included in its catalogue only 
Petrarch’s Canzoniere, Dante’s Commedia (both edited by Pietro 
Bembo), Gli Asolani by Pietro Bembo, and Jacopo Sannazaro’s Ar-
cadia. The flow slowly gathered pace in subsequent years with the 
Cortegiano by Castiglione, the Rime by Sannazaro, and the Libri tre 
delle cose de’ Turchi by Rambaldi, followed in the ’40s by the works 
of Machiavelli (the Discorsi, Storie Fiorentine, L’arte della guerra, and 
Il principe), the Regole Grammaticali by Fortunio, Poliziano’s Stanze, 
Leone d’Ebreo’s Dialoghi d’amore, and the highly successful Lettere 
2 Cfr. C.S. Celenza, Il Rinascimento perduto. La letteratura latina nella cultura italiana del 
Quattrocento, Roma, Carocci, 2004, pp. 241-263.
3 M. Tavoni, Storia della lingua italiana. Il Quattrocento, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1992, p. 65.
4 Cfr. N. Harris, Marin Sanudo, forerunner of Melzi, in «La bibliofilia», 95, 1993, pp. 101-
145; P. Trovato, Storia della lingua italiana. Il primo Cinquecento, Bologna, Il Mulino 1994, 
p. 22.
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volgari di diversi nobilissimi huomini, et eccellentissimi ingegni, scritte 
in diverse materie and Dialoghi by Sperone Speroni.
The ’30s and ’40s marked a turning point, as well as an important 
incubation period for the development of new ideas and theories on 
the vernacular that were deeply influenced by the shifting cultural 
landscape in Italy at that time. The book, with its potentially limit-
less readership, became the new focus of cultural production. The 
market shift from the court and the universities to a wider public 
sparked a demand for a language stripped of local expressions and 
allowed books to be consulted or purchased by anyone anywhere in 
the peninsula5. 
It was in this quest for linguistic cohesiveness and understand-
ability that the vernacular established itself as a language of culture6, 
a process that proved to be anything but peaceful7. The migration 
of intellectuals from one region to another fanned the flames of the 
debate about which language to adopt, and the many currents that 
formed made Italian-language production at the end of the Quat-
trocento a somewhat inharmonious affair. Venetian nobleman Pietro 
Bembo emerged as a figure of authority in the medley of linguistic 
theories. The degree to which he influenced the debate about lan-
guage in the Cinquecento may be evinced form the letter written by 
Claudio Tolomei to Agnolo Firenzuola, dated 3 November 1531, in 
which the Venetian intellectual is described as «guide and master» of 
the Italian language, «the pinnacle and foundation» of any linguistic 
theory that seeks to establish the vernacular as a language of culture8. 
2. Pietro Bembo
Bembo’s theory is contained in Prose della volgar lingua, which 
was eventually published in 1525 after a long gestation period that 
began at least as early as 1501. In that year, while preparing Pe-
trarch’s Rime for Aldo Manuzio’s printing press and restoring the 
Florentine language to its former fourteenth-century glory, Bembo 
was able to lay his hands on the original manuscript of the work, 
a real treasure-trove which until then had been in the possession of 
the Santasofia family of Padua. Thanks to this manuscript, he was 
able to undertake a comprehensive review of Petrarch’s language 
and thus, as noted, to make linguistic choices that marked a rad-
5 Cfr. P. Trovato, Storia della lingua italiana. Il primo Cinquecento, cit., p. 78.
6 Cfr. ibidem; P. Trifone, Rinascimento dal basso. Il nuovo spazio del volgare tra Quattrocento 
e Cinquecento, Roma, Bulzoni, 2006, p. 17.
7 On this topic see C. Mongiat Farina, Questione di lingua. L’ideologia del dibattito sull’i-
taliano nel Cinquecento, Ravenna, Longo, 2014.
8 A. Firenzuola, Opere, Firenze, Baronchelli, 1761, vol. IV, pp. 51-52.
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ical departure from the ones he had defended prior to seeing the 
manuscript9. It was a turning point for Bembo that allowed him to 
establish the norms of a linguistic practice that could be applied to 
other texts, such as Dante’s Commedia, as well as to assert Petrarch’s 
«pure» fourteenth-century Florentine as the language of literature10. 
In his Prose della volgar lingua Bembo aims to definitively codify 
vernacular on the blueprint of Latin in order to give it solid and du-
rable foundations and to elevate it to the status of literary language. 
To avoid misapprehension, however, it is important to note that 
adopting the vernacular language did not entail paving the way for 
«vulgar» or «popular» contents for Bembo. Writing in the vernacular 
was not the same as writing like the people; on the contrary, Bem-
bo’s intention was quite the opposite, namely to save the vernacular 
from the changeability of the living language spoken by the people. 
As long as the vernacular was subject to the vagaries of popular 
language, in Bembo’s view, it would never become the language to 
replace Latin. Humanist to the core, Bembo’s views were informed 
by the example of Classical authors. The great models of the past – 
Homer, Demosthenes, Virgil, and Cicero – never wrote in the «idiom 
that was in use and on the tongue of the populace in their times», 
rather they wrote «according to how they felt would be appreciated 
for a longer time»11. The same for Petrarch, who never wrote his 
poems «in the language used by the people of his times». Neither 
did Boccaccio «reason with the mouth of the people», even when 
attempting to make people speak «with the voices that the populace 
used»; sure enough his works are replete with expressions that were 
«not used by the people»12. The vernacular therefore cannot be cod-
ified according to how the people speak, but rather on the blueprint 
of antique models 
they reasoned with the people in a way that the people could understand, but not 
in the same way as the people reasoned with them … that writers should reason so 
that they may be understood by the people I can accept not in all writers, but in 
some; but that they should reason in the same way as the people do, this will never 
be acceptable in any writer13. 
9 Cfr. S. Pillinini, Traguardi linguistici nel Petrarca bembino del 1501, in «Studi di filologia 
italiana», 29, 1981, pp. 57-76; G. Frasso, Appunti sul Petrarca Aldino del 1501, in Vestigia. 
Studi in onore di Giuseppe Billanovich, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1984, vol. I, pp. 
315-336; L. Marcozzi, Pietro Bembo e le varianti d’autore petrarchesche. Teoria del «mutamento» 
nelle Prose e pratica variantistica nelle Rime, in Prose della volgar lingua di Pietro Bembo, Mila-
no, Cisalpino, 2000, pp. 209-253; S. Giarin, Petrarca e Bembo: l’edizione aldina del Canzoniere, 
in «Studi di filologia italiana», 62, 2004, pp. 161-193.
10 The «alcune notazioni della lingua», which were written for his beloved Maria Savorgnan 
and would later feed into the Prose, date back to this period.
11 P. Bembo, Prose della volgar lingua, introduction and notes by C. Dionisotti, Torino, 
UTET, 1931, p. 31.
12 Ibidem.
13 Ibidem, p. 32.
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Bembo retained something of the aristocratic view of culture 
that had characterized his humanist teachers14. It was not the living 
language of the people, by which was meant the «masses», that 
would lead to the establishment of the vernacular language, but the 
sophisticated idiom that was accessible only to «very few men in 
each century»15. Bembo in other words sought justification for the 
literary use of the vernacular within, rather than beyond, humanist 
culture, based on the style and rhetorical devices of Classical oratory, 
Ciceronian Latin especially. In applying the rules of Cicero’s Latin 
to the vernacular, Bembo effectively brought about a renaissance of 
the Classical culture that was so close to the heart of Humanism. 
Humanism taught not only imitation (imitatio), but also and above 
all emulation (aemulatio), the aim therefore being not only to imi-
tate the style of Cicero in order to produce a Latin prose that was 
the same as Classical Latin, but to emulate him, and in so doing to 
create something new which today we can reasonably call human-
ist vernacular literature. Living Florentine and the language of the 
courts both promoted the adoption of vernacular, but neither was a 
valid solution for Bembo. In his view, their lack of rules and style 
prevented the vernacular language from becoming a genuine literary 
language. For this reason Bembo rejected the idea that there can 
be a language without writing, in other words without a literature: 
«an idiom without a writer cannot be said to be a real language»16. 
Living, lawless Florentine dialect was not a suitable model. As Carlo 
Dionisotti has pointed out, the spontaneity of the living language 
prevented the necessary compliance with Classical rhetoric that for 
Bembo was required for a literary use of the vernacular language17. 
Elegance in writing thus derives «in Latin like in the vernacular from 
the accurate observance of the norms of the language, as they appear 
in the stylistically more polished works written in that language»18. 
Stylistic perfection thus presupposes a standardized, ordered, and 
pure language, which is why the focus in the Prose is not «on the 
content of what is written, but how it is written»19. In the Prose, 
therefore, Bembo refers to rhetoric only as form, without any con-
nection to content, and on the strength of its compliance to the rules 
of style, rhetoric, and grammar he can «safely» judge the vernacular 
literature, for instance arguing that Petrarch and Boccaccio were 
superior to Dante, who was a little loose in his rhyming and choice 
14 For an aristocratic conception of «humanism», cfr. G. Toffanin, Che cosa fu l’umanesimo, 
Firenze, Sansoni, 1929.
15 P. Bembo, Prose della volgar lingua, cit., p. 32.
16 Ibidem, pp. 24-25.
17 Ibidem, p. xix.
18 C. Dionisotti, Scritti sul Bembo, Torino, Einaudi, 2002, p. 215.
19 P. Bembo, Prose della volgar lingua, cit., p. 43.
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of vocabulary despite being sublime for the content. Form in Bembo 
thus took precedence over content. Petrarch and Boccaccio were the 
models of the vernacular literature, hence it was in their writings, 
according to Bembo, that the rules of grammar were to be sought. 
What mattered above all else was to discover the rules and ideas 
that would shape timeless models, on the basis of which it would 
be possible for the vernacular to compete on a par with Latin. On 
this point, as we have seen in the case of Dante, Bembo was uncom-
promising, and it is from this standpoint that we must approach the 
third book of the Prose, which deals with the rules of grammar. Yet, 
for all his rigidity, in the second book of his Prose he displays a cer-
tain malleability, «especially as regards prose, a field that is far more 
open and wide and free than verse»20. And it is this rare instance of 
malleability that the following generation of scholars would exploit. 
The linguistic model developed by Bembo, with its insistence 
upon the stylistic and grammatical rules of fourteenth-century Tuscan, 
was adopted outright in the Cinquecento as the model of reference 
for all vernacular compositions, of course with some distinctions in 
prose and poetry. Bembism became the buzzword in printing houses, 
convents, chancelleries, and even pulpits all over Italy, and from the 
second half of the Cinquecento onwards, the vernacular evolved from 
the traditions of the late fifteenth century to embrace Bembian ideals 
of language and style21. 
The Cinquecento thus marked «the decisive spread throughout It-
aly of a unitary linguistic type»22, the Bembian type, whose founding 
principles, as Claudio Marazzini has argued, 
had won over the majority of the men of culture: 1. The vernacular was equal to 
Latin in terms of dignity; 2. The vernacular was excellently suited to producing 
literature, when used at a “high” level with “noble” forms; 3. Such a “high” level 
could be reached by adhering to the model set out in the Prose della volgar lingua 
by Pietro Bembo (1525), in other words imitating the great Tuscan authors of the 
Trecento, especially Petrarch and Boccaccio …; 4. In itself, “Florentineness”, being 
a necessary condition of “natural Tuscanness”, that is the advantage of being born 
in Tuscany, was no guarantee for a priori possession of the literary language, be-
cause the literary language had to be modelled upon the example of written texts 
(especially Petrarch’s Canzoniere and Boccaccio’s Decameron), not on the variety of 
language that was used23. 
20 P. Bembo, Prose della volgar lingua, cit., p. 72.
21 Cfr. P. Trovato, Storia della lingua italiana. Il primo Cinquecento, cit., pp. 48, 57, 72; M. 
Tavoni, Le Prose della volgar lingua di Pietro Bembo, in Letteratura italiana. Le opere. I: Dalle 
Origini al Cinquecento, Torino, Einaudi, 1992, pp. 1084-1086.
22 Cfr. G. Ghinassi, Sulla lingua del Cinquecento, in «Cultura e scuola», 3, 1964, p. 34. Cfr. 
M. Vitale, L’oro nella lingua. Contributi per una storia del tradizionalismo e del purismo italiano, 
Milano-Napoli, Ricciardi, 1986.
23 Cfr. C. Marazzini, Storia della lingua italiana. Il secondo Cinquecento e il Seicento, cit., 
pp. 149-150.
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The point, which is established here as an incontrovertible datum 
in the research, in my view stands in contradiction to another that is 
equally as important, but has so far been overlooked by the scholar-
ship. Most theorists of the vernacular language who contributed to 
the establishment of vernacular as a language of culture appear to 
criticize Bembo’s theory, whether directly or indirectly, saying that: 
1. The vernacular was sometimes superior to Latin in terms of its 
expressive capacity; 
2. The vernacular suited all literary genres, whether poetry or 
prose, and all styles, from low to high; 
3. The dignity of the vernacular does not depend necessarily on 
predetermined norms, which on the contrary are often seen as a 
barrier to communication and hence the advancement of knowledge; 
4. Spoken language sometimes has even greater dignity than the 
written language in that it represents the primary form of commu-
nication. 
From Sperone Speroni onwards, passing through Alessandro 
Piccolomini, Giovan Battista Gelli and Benedetto Varchi, to name 
but a few of the authors we shall examine here, there was a general 
shift away from Bembo’s theoretical model, even when there was 
compliance on a practical level. The manner in which they read 
Bembo’s text was to seal the fate of the Prose, which came to play 
«a role in Italian culture that was opposite to what it had been 
written for, namely as a weapon of divisiveness rather than a means 
for approaching Classical culture»24. In the memorable words of 
Giancarlo Mazzacurati: Bembo’s Prose is «one of the most dramatic 
works of the century, not for what is there, but for what is not there 
and should have been there; for the crisis of values that hangs over 
it and provides a backdrop to it, and for the superficial acceptance 
of a situation which in and of itself marks the end of all those ideals 
which its author nonetheless believed in; and for the sense of emp-
tiness it left in its wake»25. 
3. A New Paradigm
On a theoretical level, Bembo’s project was betrayed. The serious 
question to ask is why. Why was Bembo’s theory betrayed when his 
grammatical and stylistic precepts prevailed in practical terms? How 
can we explain this discrepancy between the failure of a theoretical 
24 Cfr. G. Mazzacurati, La crisi della retorica umanistica nel Cinquecento (Antonio Riccobo-
no), Napoli, Libreria scientifica editrice, 1961, p. 47; M. Tavoni, Le «Prose della volgar lingua» 
di Pietro Bembo, cit., p. 1084.
25 Ibidem.
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model and the assertion of a practical one? The answer in my view 
is philosophical more than philological or historical-linguistic, because 
the difference between Bembo and, say, Speroni, or Piccolomini, is 
theoretical. In terms of style, in other words in the act of writing 
and composing texts, these authors, through the mediation of the 
printers, followed Bembo’s rules; but they thought differently on a 
theoretical level.
There is no easy and simple answer to these questions. A partial 
explanation could be that Bembo’s Prose was published at a time 
when an paradigm shift was underway which his work probably even 
helped to advance. The shift is best represented by the transition 
from Plato to Aristotle, which can be grasped intuitively by looking 
at Raphael’s famous fresco, School of Athens. Plato points towards 
the heavens, Hyperuranion, and the world of ideas, while in the 
other hand holding the Timaeus, the text that deals with the shaping 
of the cosmos by the Demiurge according to ideal archetypes. He 
stands for the otherworldly, transcendent dimension towards which 
man must advance. This image clearly suggests a vertical conception 
of man, whose purpose and fulfilment is to be sought above and 
beyond himself. Aristotle, on the other hand, stretches one hand 
forwards, above the earth, while in the other he clutches the Ethics, 
the book that teaches us to fulfil our human nature in this life. He 
stands for mundane life in the world inhabited by man, which man 
can fully embrace and understand. This is a horizontal conception 
in which man’s fulfilment is before him and around him. The same 
motif recurs in the two relief sculptures in the medallions at the base 
of the dome, as if reiterating the dual perspective of the fresco pre-
sented by the opposition of these two different philosophies. There is 
therefore a transition in the Renaissance from the traditional vertical 
model represented by Plato, which was also that of Christianity and 
Scholasticism, to the model represented by the recently rediscovered 
Aristotle26, which is also the model of the new naturalism27.
If we view this paradigm change in the light of the theory of lan-
guage, we can explain Bembo’s theoretical defeat. To anticipate brief-
ly my argument, in the field of linguistic theory Bembo reflected the 
Platonic view, while Speroni, Piccolomini, Gelli, and Varchi reflected 
the Aristotelian view. With his attachment to norms, rules, and the 
26 I speak here of a «rediscovered Aristotle» and a «pure Aristotelianism» in juxtaposition 
to the Aristotle and Aristotelianism of Scholasticism. The latter was heavily influenced by 
Neo-Platonism, whereas the former was informed by the recent rediscovery of Greek com-
mentators, and promoted, primarily in the form of Alexandrism, a naturalistic, de-theologized 
view of Aristotelian philosophy.
27 «Naturalism» does denote a greater intellectual interest in nature, rather a reappraisal 
of man’s relationship with the whole of nature. E. Garin, Storia della filosofia italiana, Torino, 
Einaudi, 1966, vol. II, pp. 500-501.
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perfect codification of the vernacular according to the timeless sty-
listic models of Petrarch and Boccaccio, Bembo effectively presented 
a Platonic-Ciceronian linguistic theory with a clear vertical tension 
towards an ideal form. The document that most clearly illustrates 
Bembo’s position is the letter to Giovanfrancesco Pico della Mirando-
la, dated 1 January 1513, and commonly referred to as De imitatione. 
Bembo here states that one must keep before one’s eyes «the most 
beautiful and perfect image, working diligently to reproduce it»28. In 
opposition to Giovanfrancesco, he denies that it is possible to imitate 
many excellent authors, because when imitating «we should imitate 
not what is good but what is best and most perfect»29. There can 
be only one model in the composition of verse or prose30. That he 
is in fact upholding an entirely Platonic position is made clear when 
he reproaches Giovanfrancesco for bad Platonism. Bembo considers 
himself to be the true interpreter of Platonic teachings:
 I know that you uphold the view of the school of Plato, which related what was 
best in nature to divine ideas and images; and I agree that there exists in God, 
author and founder of the universe, not only a certain divine and altogether perfect 
image of justice, temperance, and the other virtues, but also of correct writing. Xe-
nophon, Demosthenes and Plato, Crassus, Antonius, Julius, and, most of all Cicero, 
when composing and writing, directed their minds and their style to this as far as 
they could. And I think we must try to do the same31.
Gianfrancesco’s Platonism is not in question, but his approach 
is anodyne because it presumes to take the best from multiple au-
thors rather than adhering to a single ideal. To be truly Platonic in 
Bembo’s view is therefore to embrace a single model and a single 
ideal rather than multiple ones, as appears to be the case with Mi-
randolese. Although one has to embrace a single model in order to 
be consistently Platonic, however, it is not Bembo’s intention to set 
up an imaginary ideal, «as Plato and Cicero did»32, that is to say 
one that is fictive and invented. His desire is for a concrete model 
represented by Cicero’s style, but his concrete model nonetheless 
28 I. Scott, Controversies over the Imitation of Cicero as a Model for Style and Some Phases 
of their Influence on the Schools of the Renaissance, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1910, p. 9. On this topic see the insightful remarks of Martin McLaughlin in Id., Literary 
Imitation in the Italian Renaissance, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995.
29 Ibidem.
30 The genesis of the model, or how the model is revealed for Bembo, has been defined 
by turn as both Aristotelian and Stoic; but that the use he makes of the model as the ideal 
of reference is Platonic is not in question. Cfr. J. Robert, Norm, Kritik, Autorität. Der Brief-
wechsel De imitatione zwischen Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola und Pietro Bembo und der 
Nachahmungsdiskurs in der Frühen Neuzeit, in «Daphnis», 30, 2001, pp. 597-644. Here we see 
also the contradiction in Bembo’s linguistic theory: he «discovers» the model of language in 
a specific historical language, namely Petrarch’s Ciceronianism, while attempting to make this 
language eternal and atemporal.
31 Ibidem, pp. 9-10.
32 Ibidem, p. 10.
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remains an ideal towards which to aspire, and in this sense Bembo 
can be considered linguistically Platonic. 
On the other hand, the linguistic theories of Speroni, Piccolomini 
and all the others leave aside any reference to models and timeless 
ideals. They do not pursue a norm that is hidden or lost in some 
Hyperuranion, or in the various regional forms, rather their aim is 
the communication and sharing of ideas in a world made of men 
who can only realize their true natures in horizontal relationships. 
The betrayal of Bembism – which is to all intents and purposes a be-
trayal of humanism itself – became possible only thanks to a change 
of mindset among the intellectuals of the Cinquecento resulting from 
a paradigm-shift in the conception of man followed by a change in 
linguistic theory: man went from being construed in terms of his 
relationship with God and his divine and immortal nature to being 
studied in relation to other men (and the surrounding cosmos), in 
those features that are closest to his mortal nature33. More specifical-
ly, my purpose is to emphasize that it was thanks to the rediscovery 
of an Aristotelianism cleansed of the theological conditionings of 
Scholasticism, itself very much Plato-oriented, that it was possible for 
the likes of Speroni, Piccolomini, Varchi, etc., to advance a linguistic 
model that undermined Bembo’s. 
From examining each one of these intellectuals by turn, it will 
become clear how this paradigm shift favoured the establishment of 
the vernacular as the language of culture for all literary genres and 
styles, while the Platonic model could only limit the use of the ver-
nacular to certain genres where the norm could be applied without 
compromising the communication involved in the linguistic act. 
4. Pietro Pomponazzi
In order to understand this change in anthropological outlook 
and to see how the new conception took root among the language 
theorists of the Cinquecento, one must start with Pietro Pomponazzi. 
Teacher to Speroni and mentor to Varchi, this Mantuan philosopher 
is best known for the claim that it is impossible to demonstrate the 
immortality of the soul rationally. Despite being renowned for «not 
knowing any language other than Mantuan»34, his contribution to 
the development of a new theory of language had a lasting, albeit 
indirect impact on the assertion of the vernacular as a language of 
33 Just consider the shift that occurred over a period of a century from works such as De 
dignitate hominis by Giannozzo Manetti, De excellentia ac praestantia hominis by Bartolomeo 
Fazio and De hominis dignitate by Pico Della Mirandola to a work such as De humani corporis 
fabrica by Andrea Vesalio.
34 S. Speroni, Dialogo delle lingue, Pescara, Libreria dell’Università, 1999, p. 180.
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culture. Pomponazzi’s Aristotelian anthropology is first outlined in 
the Tractatus de immortalitate animae, published in 1516. The book 
opens with a simple observation that seemingly places him squarely 
within the fold of fifteenth-century Platonic philosophy: the nature 
of man is complex and ancipital, standing midway between mortals 
and immortals, between beasts and angels and God35. But he then 
goes on to offer a quintessentially Aristotelian definition of man 
based on reference to what he calls pure men: «those who have lived 
moderately according to moral virtue, but have not given themselves 
completely to the intellect, nor to the bodily functions»36. Man is 
defined by his pre-eminently moral and ethical nature, and it is here, 
within the sphere of Aristotelian ethics, that Pomponazzi’s anthropol-
ogy takes root. 
The first step to understanding human nature, therefore, is to 
grasp its purpose. As the ultimate fulfilment of a thing, that is to 
say insofar as it defines a perfect thing37, every purpose is good for 
Pomponazzi38. But that which is good in an absolute sense cannot 
be attributed as a purpose to every thing, but only insofar as it is 
suited to a given nature: seeing is better than not seeing, but is not 
suited to a plant, and therefore cannot be something truly good for 
it. Similarly, one must not attribute to man the same purpose that is 
attributed to God, because it would not be appropriate. Pomponaz-
zi goes on to say that that which is good for one thing is good for 
all individuals of the same type; hence what is good for one man 
is good for all men. The aim is to determine what is the common 
good for all men. 
Pomponazzi believes that all men share speculative, practical, and 
factive intellect. The speculative intellect is the theoretical capacity to 
know the essence of things scientifically; the factive intellect provides 
man with everything he needs to survive; and the practical intellect 
is concerned with customs, politics, and domestic economy. But it 
is the practical intellect that characterizes man as man. The factive 
intellect is common not only to men but also to beasts, whereas only 
a handful of wise men possess the speculative intellect in its fullest 
and most perfect form39. If only a few can speculate fully, then this 
faculty cannot be common to the whole human race, because that 
must be something that belongs to all. Pomponazzi’s thesis thus over-
turns the conception of man, whose primary activity in the Platonic 
and Scholastic tradition was contemplative and speculative. Hence 
35 Cfr. P. Pomponazzi, Tractatus acutissimi, utillimi et mere peripatetici, Venezia, Scoto, 
1525, p. 41r.
36 Ibidem.
37 Ibidem, p. 48r.
38 Aristotle, Metaphysics, II.2, 994 b 12-13.
39 Cfr. Pomponazzi, Tractatus acutissimi, utillimi et mere peripatetici, cit., pp. 48v-49r.
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in Pomponazzi man is defined by his vita activa, while only very few 
individuals have the capacity to know that which pertains exclusively 
to higher intelligences and to God40. Any characteristic that would 
suggest a connection between man and transcendence is eschewed 
in Pomponazzi’s anthropology, where man’s true essence resides in 
the practical and moral sphere that is fulfilled in the world, hence 
in politics, and in time, hence history. And it is in the field of his-
tory that we find the most original aspects of Pomponazzi’s thought, 
which will be reflected also in his linguistic theories. In De fato, he 
states that men in the world are subject to necessity, infinity, and the 
cyclicity of the universe and history41. Not only the natural elements 
are subject to these necessary and cyclical laws, but also human civi-
lizations and their languages. In De incantationibus he explicitly states 
that each city, people, or any other convention, including religions42, 
arise, develop, and die in cycles, just as under one prince certain 
words, customs and flags are used, and when he is replaced they are 
changed, vituperated, and destroyed43. If words, like civilizations, are 
destined to go through the cycle of birth, zenith, and destruction, 
then languages are too. Thus, if we follow Pomponazzi’s thought, all 
philosophical and theoretical assumptions concerning the superiority 
of the Latin language and fourteenth-century Italian come to nothing: 
every epoch is characterized by its own language, and the language 
of the Cinquecento is the vernacular, the mother tongue.
5. Sperone Speroni
These ideas are echoed in Sperone Speroni. Speroni’s first pro-
grammatic text to deal with the vernacular language is the treatise 
Del modo di studiare. From the outset, Speroni develops an Aristo-
telian anthropology along Pomponazzian lines. He asserts that words 
are signs or figures of the concepts and thoughts of the intellect44. 
Only the intellect with its concepts sets us apart from beasts, because 
however beautiful and ornate words and languages are, they alone 
do not make the difference between man and other living beings. 
Experience and history teach us that animals can produce them 
too45. Language is nothing more than a means for expressing and 
40 Pomponazzi finds support for his interpretation in Aristotle himself, a passage in Meta-
physics, XII.7, 1072 b 15, 24 where it is stated that the contemplative life is given to men only 
briefly and only sporadically. 
41 P. Pomponazzi, Il fato, il libero arbitrio e la predestinazione, Torino, Aragno, 2004, V, 
Epilogus, 4.
42 Cfr. P. Pomponazzi, De incantationibus, Firenze, Olschki, 2011, p. 148.
43 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 151. 
44 Cfr. S. Speroni, Opere, Venezia, Occhi, 1740, vol. II, p. 487.
45 Cfr. Ibidem.
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articulating the concepts that are contained within the mind46. Hence 
the quest for the perfect language is entirely secondary and subordi-
nate to the knowledge of the concepts that give rise to wisdom. He 
is deeply critical of those who waste their time «not learning why 
the truth is manifested, but what diction a Greek or Latin author 
used to signify any given thing back in their day»47. Interestingly, for 
Speroni there are two types of wisdom. One is called contemplative, 
and concerns the knowledge of God and nature, whereas the other 
is civil or active, and concerns all man’s virtuous actions48. He states, 
echoing Pomponazzi, that the contemplative life pertains properly 
only to God, and to man only in a diminished way. Hence a man 
may be described as wise only because sometimes he may have an 
inkling of the knowledge that God has at all times. But man can 
never be completely wise49, because the human intellect is hazy and 
illuminates only that which is closest to man, namely that which per-
tains to natural philosophy50. Hence, if the complete knowledge of 
«contemplative wisdom is not the vocation of mortal creatures, then 
active wisdom must be; otherwise, there is nothing that can properly 
be called human»51. Here we find a clear reference to the anthropo-
logical conception outlined in Pomponazzi’s De immortalitate: active 
life is the only one to be properly human, whereas contemplative 
life is not accessible to the common man. Pomponazzi’s influence is 
even more obvious when Speroni asserts that civil science teaches ac-
cording to the true nature of man, which is to live as a citizen, how 
to acquire good moral behaviour (ethics), the government of the re-
public (politics), and the government of the house (economics)52, the 
three areas that the Mantuan philosopher viewed as constituting the 
practical intellect53. Speroni also adopts Pomponazzi’s theory of the 
cyclicity of history and the historicity of languages54: every age has 
its particular culture and language55. If the purpose of a language is 
to communicate, then it is advisable to use the language that is most 
widely understood. This is even more relevant for someone wishing 
to speak rhetorically and ornately, because his job is easier if he ac-
commodates the variety of customs of people living under different 
laws and at different times, rather than speaking in dead languages56.
46 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 488.
47 Ibidem.
48 Cfr. Ibidem.
49 Cfr. Ibidem, pp. 490-491.
50 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 496.
51 Ibidem, p. 494.
52 Ibidem, p. 498.
53 These ideas receive further treatment in the longer work Dialogo della vita attiva e 
contemplativa.
54 Cfr. Ibidem, pp. 503-505.
55 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 504.
56 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 508. 
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Such themes all receive fuller treatment in the more renowned 
Dialogo delle lingue, a genuine new Renaissance agenda that attested 
to the growing discrepancy with humanism. The text is a dialogue 
between multiple interlocutors, and the most interesting position is 
Scholar’s defence of the position of a fictional Pomponazzi, according 
to which every vernacular language can be used, as long as it is can 
express concepts. Like elsewhere, Speroni’s arguments are rooted in 
Pomponazzian anthropology. In many ways man is different from ani-
mals and brutes, the main difference being that «we communicate our 
heart to one another, which beasts do not do»57. Note that it is not 
ornate language or reason that sets man apart from other animals, but 
the capacity to communicate. Speroni’s entire theory of the vernacular, 
expressed by the Scholar, is based upon this concept of the commu-
nicability of thoughts. His arguments in favour of the vernacular as 
the language of culture are clear and simple. It is not necessary to 
know Greek and Latin to be educated, on the contrary. The «study of 
Greek and Latin is the cause of our ignorance», and if we were not 
devoting so much time and effort to study them, we would probably 
have philosophers like Plato and Aristotle in the «new age» too, be-
cause in terms of genius, the moderns are no less than the ancients58. 
For this reason, the Mantuan philosopher hopes that all knowledge 
may some day be communicated in the vernacular59, because this is 
the only way in which also those who do not know Greek or Latin 
will be able to expand their horizons and contribute to new scientific 
discoveries. Hence for Pomponazzi it is to be hoped that one day «of 
every thing in every country I may speak every language» and that 
the sciences and the arts should be under the tyranny of the Classical 
languages no longer60. All languages are equally worthy of expressing 
the concepts of the mind61, including scientific and philosophical 
concepts, because languages are an artificial instrument that «without 
distinction of words» signifies the passions of men, and does so all the 
more effectively when each person uses their own language. Naturally, 
therefore, men start reasoning and communicating their thoughts in 
their native language, which is the easiest and most suitable62. Speaking 
and reasoning in a language that is different from one’s own native 
language is in every sense secondary and artificial, if not indeed unnat-
ural. Writing and languages are tools that men have invented for their 
own use and convenience to express «the secrets of the heart to one 
another», and by means of which it is possible to attain the happiness 
57 S. Speroni, Dialogo delle lingue, cit., p. 124.
58 Cfr. Ibidem, pp. 186, 188.
59 Ibidem, p. 184.
60 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 188.
61 Ibidem, p. 192.
62 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 202.
The Instatement of the Vernacular as Language of Culture
331
that resides not so much in the words themselves, but in the concepts 
and doctrines63. The Bembian notion that a language acquired dignity 
only through being codified in writing is thus abandoned completely 
in Speroni, at the heart of whose linguistic project is the power of 
communication. Speroni’s project was carried forward by Bernardino 
Tomitano. His ideas are collected in the Ragionamenti della lingua to-
scana (1545), a wholehearted endorsement of the vernacular language 
and its dissemination in fields of learning traditionally claimed by Lat-
in, such as philosophy and the natural sciences. Tomitano’s compliance 
with Speroni’s agenda is total:
 I set out to show that knowledge, being cognition of things that separates us 
from beasts … the things make the human being wise, and the words make him 
appear so. The voice places us in common with and makes us similar to beasts, 
while thought separates us from them, making us similar to God64.
Like Speroni, Tomitano believes that it is not the word, but the 
possibility of sharing and communicating knowledge that sets men 
apart from all other beings. The quest for a codified language is 
thus of marginal importance, and adds nothing new to the content 
of knowledge that exists behind the words: 
 In addition to this, Aristotle and Plato’s speaking in Greek rather than Latin adds 
nothing to the power of cognition of the things they say; … the Tuscan, Venetian, 
Paduan and Brescian words and the other languages will convey the same essence 
to anyone who reads in the Greek65.
Searching for a sophisticated language adds nothing to the ca-
pacity to communicate; hence it is entirely legitimate to use Tuscan, 
Venetian, Paduan, or Lombard, rather than Greek or Latin.
6. Alessandro Piccolomini
Also greatly indebted to Speroni’s linguistic project is Alessandro 
Piccolomini. When eventually, at around the age of thirty, he moved 
to Padua, Speroni’s works had already been circulating in manuscript 
form for some time. The fact of Piccolomini’s dependence on Sper-
oni’s work is made clear in the treatise De la Institutione di tutta 
la vita de l’homo (1542). Like Speroni’s Del modo di studiare, the 
Institutione by Piccolomini is based on Pomponazzi’s anthropology. 
The end, that is the ultimate fulfilment of a human’s life, in Picco-
lomini’s view, is happiness, and it is attained by operating according 
63 Cfr. Ibidem. 
64 B. Tomitano, Ragionamenti della lingua toscana, Venezia, De Farri, 1546, pp. 4-5.
65 Ibidem, p. 40.
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to virtue, in other words by achieving the form that is specific to the 
human being66. Virtue consists in the triumph of the noble part of 
the soul, namely reason, over the irrational appetites that make men 
similar to beasts67. There are two paths to victory: either through 
contemplation by means of the speculative intellect, or through ac-
tions by means of the practical intellect. There can therefore be two 
types of happiness: one speculative and one practical. Only practical 
happiness is common to all men, however, because speculative hap-
piness, as we have already seen in Pomponazzi, is restricted to very 
few individuals, and anyway is the prerogative only of theologians68. 
In order for practical happiness to be reached, it is best to educate 
people to perform good actions from childhood. During its third 
year especially, the child must learn its «mother’s language», which 
is its first means of expressing the concepts of the mind using signs 
that allow it to converse with other people in society. This charac-
teristic sets men apart from other animals, because it allows them to 
manifest will and thought, which would otherwise be overshadowed 
by the basest appetites69. Like Speroni and Tomitano, Piccolomini 
bases his thesis on the primordial expressive capacity of the vernac-
ular. Unlike Speroni, however, who considered all languages to be 
worthy of use as a means of communication, Piccolomini favours 
the Tuscan language as the gentlest, easiest, and fairest sounding70, 
distinguishing between a literary Tuscan spoken by «men of sound 
judgement» and the language of the populace, which must not be 
taught at all71. This does not detract from the idea of the vernacular 
as a language of culture that is capable of expressing even the most 
complex contents, however. He is simply acknowledging the fact 
that the excessive variability of the spoken language might inhibit 
the correct understanding of a communication. By distinguishing 
between an educated vernacular and a vernacular of the common 
people, Piccolomini is not supporting the Bembian project to codify 
the language. In his letter to Pietro Aretino, dated 20 March 1541, 
he expresses his aversion to the classicist notion of reviving the 
«dead language» of Petrarch and Boccaccio, advocating instead for 
a language that is capable of coining new terms for new concepts. 72 
The letter is nothing short of an outline for a theory of language. He 
asserts that translation into the vernacular does not mean to trans-
66 Cfr. A. Piccolomini, De la Institutione di tutta la vita de l’homo nato nobile e in città 
libera, Venezia, Scoto, 1545, p. 16r. 
67 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 21v.
68 Cfr. Ibidem, pp. 22r-23v.
69 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 29r.
70 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 29v.
71 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 43r.
72 P. Aretino, Lettere scritte al Sig. Pietro Aretino da molti signori, comunità, donne di ualore, 
poeti, et altri eccellentissimi spiriti, Venezia, Marcolini, 1552, pp. 143r-146v. 
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late literally, rather it involves summarizing, paraphrasing, presenting 
doctrines that are articulated in Greek and Latin so that they may be 
understood even by the roughest of intellects73. His aims are
 One, to bring those doctrines which I intended to deal with into our language, 
which is perfectly capable, in my view, of handling any science; and the other to 
unravel and open up and illuminate matters so that their intelligence becomes so 
easy and open that anyone who is not entirely uncouth and intellectually incapable 
may understand it, or at least most of it74.
Piccolomini’s purpose is to show how the vernacular can be put 
to use as a language of culture and science that will supplant Greek 
and Latin. In order to achieve this, however, it is necessary first to 
break with the rigid parameters of Bembism, which is defined as an 
«unreasonable proposition» because of the idea that one cannot write 
using words and forms that are different from those that have been 
codified in the fourteenth-century Italian of Petrarch and Boccaccio75. 
His rebellion against Bembo is clear in the Sfera del mondo:
 And to make this text less confused and easier to understand, I took some 
concepts that have no proper name in our language, to use words that perhaps 
cannot be found in either Boccaccio or Petrarch because they never had occasion 
to handle such concepts. And I was zealous in my intent because I judged it to be 
better to be understood with words that were not entirely ours than, whether by 
circumlocution or illustrating with some other forced reduction, to make my words 
so confused and hazy that what I essay to communicate through them cannot be 
understood by others, let alone by myself76.
The primary objective is to communicate and be understood, and 
in order to do this it is necessary to introduce new words. Hence 
the endeavour to establish the vernacular language is also an endeav-
our to introduce new words, a topic that is by no means marginal, 
becoming indeed something of an obsession for Piccolomini. He 
was aware about the fact that it is only by introducing new words 
to designate new discoveries and concepts that it is possible to con-
tribute to the advancement of knowledge, which otherwise would be 
inhibited77. It is a significant point in his theory, because it corrob-
orates the view that it is only by adopting a living vernacular that 
knowledge may effectively be advanced78. Piccolomini’s vernacular is 
73 Cfr. A. Piccolomini, Libro della Poetica d’Aristotele, Siena, Bonetti, 1572, Ai lettori. 
74 A. Piccolomini, Copiosissima parafrase di M. Alessandro Piccolomini nel primo libro della 
Retorica di Aristotele, Venezia, Varisco, 1565, pp. 4-5. 
75 Cfr. A. Virgili, Francesco Berni, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1881, pp. 229-246.
76 A. Piccolomini, Della sfera del mondo, Venezia, Del Pozzo, 1552, p. 3v.
77 A. Piccolomini, La prima parte della filosofia naturale, Roma, Valgrisi, 1551, pp. 1br-v.
78 Cfr. A. Siekiera, La questione della lingua in Alessandro Piccolomini, in Alessandro Picco-
lomini (1508-1579), Paris, Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche sur la Renaissance Italienne, 
2012, p. 227.
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thus chameleon-like, not hidebound by rules of grammar and style, 
because knowledge evolves constantly and must be communicated to 
as wide a public as possible. 
In his Ragguagli di Parnaso (1612), Traiano Boccalini remembers 
Piccolomini for his particular approach to vulgarization, as a kind 
of Promethean hero who assails the decision by the god Apollo to 
prohibit the dissemination of knowledge in the vernacular to as wide 
a public as possible79. 
7. Giovan Battista Gelli
The writings of Giovan Battista Gelli clearly show that the ideas 
of Sperone Speroni and Alessandro Piccolomini gained currency also 
beyond the borders of Veneto. Gelli’s revolt against Bembo is voiced 
in Ragionamento sopra la difficultà di mettere in regole la nostra lin-
gua, published in 1551 along with Della lingua che si parla e si scrive 
in Firenze by Pier Francesco Giambullari. This short work by Gelli 
has often been considered the fiercest attack on the use of rules to 
codify a living language that is in constant change, and therefore a 
determined defence of spoken Florentine80. But such a view holds 
true only within the narrow context of the debate surrounding the 
founding of a Florentine grammar that was taking place in the Ac-
cademia fiorentina, not if we look further into his theory of language 
as presented in I capricci del Bottaio (1546). Gelli certainly rejects 
the idea of fossilizing and codifying the Florentine language along 
Bembian lines by modelling it on a Trecento-esque ideal, but not, as 
is often assumed, because such a project was partly conceived by a 
man from Venice who was a non-native speaker. Gelli’s concern was 
not to normalize and standardize the vernacular, but rather to pro-
mote a language that could be understood by and communicated to 
everyone. The ideas presented in I capricci are identical to Speroni’s, 
and are expressed in a very similar language. That Gelli, the son of a 
cobbler, should express his ideas through the words of a barrel-mak-
er is a telling point. His work is in fact a critique of the artisan and 
merchant class of his time, which is concerned with acquiring wealth 
more than culture. The fact of not being able to devote oneself to 
culture, however, is determined not only by the myopia of needing to 
acquire wealth, but also by the difficulty of gaining access to knowl-
edge which was still transmitted primarily in the classical languages. 
The ultimate aim of a language, as for Speroni and Piccolomini, 
79 Cfr. T. Boccalini, De’ Ragguagli di Parnaso, Venezia, Farri, 1612, pp. 315-316. 
80 Cfr. C. Marazzini, Storia della lingua italiana. Il secondo Cinquecento e il Seicento, cit., 
p. 165.
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is to communicate the concepts of the soul. In Gelli’s words, «the 
vernacular language is thus as suitable for expressing its concepts as 
Latin»81. Any concept may be expressed in the vernacular, even «the 
difficult matters of philosophy, no less easily and perfectly than by 
any Latin author»82. Contrary to those who say that «any who do 
not know grammar are unworthy», in other words the humanists, 
including Bembo, Gelli states that «grammar, or rather Latin, is a 
language, and languages are not what make men learned, rather con-
cepts and sciences … it is the things, not the languages, that make 
men learned; and although they are signified with words, a person 
who understands only the words would never be worth anything»83. 
Speronian Pomponazzi and Gelli are thus in perfect accord84. To 
whomever believes that knowledge is closed within the confines of 
the Greek and Latin languages Gelli writes that 
 Our language is perfectly suited to expressing any concept of philosophy or 
astrology, or any other science, and every bit as well as Latin, perhaps even Greek 
too, about which they make such a fuss85.
The point that «it is not languages that make men learned, but 
the sciences; and that one learns languages to acquire the sciences 
they contain» is repeated several times in Gelli86. Language and 
words are only tools that can help in the acquisition of knowledge, 
and there is no fixed or codified language that can somehow describe 
the new developments in knowledge. Gelli here echoes Piccolomi-
ni, stating that it is legitimate for native speakers of a given living 
language to introduce new terms because such terms follow the 
evolution of knowledge. The vernacular must follow the example of 
Latin, and the Tuscans should follow the example of the Romans, 
who, «loving their own things (as is right and reasonable) more than 
those of others, studied foreign languages only to see if they could 
get something positive out of them and enrich their own»87. To es-
tablish the vernacular as a language of culture in the same way as 
the Romans did for Latin and Greek, is almost a moral imperative, 
because «the true responsibility of the citizens is always, in which-
ever way possible, to benefit their country, to which we are no less 
obliged than to our own fathers and mothers»88. Gelli pursues the 
same aims as Speroni and Piccolomini, hoping that one day 
81 G.B. Gelli, Opere, Torino, UTET, 1976, p. 177.
82 Ibidem, p. 178.
83 Ibidem.
84 Cfr. Gelli, Opere, cit., p. 183. 
85 Ibidem, p. 182.
86 Ibidem, p. 195.
87 Ibidem, p. 196.
88 Ibidem, p. 198.
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whoever wishes to learn will not need to waste four to six of his best years learning 
a language, only to then use it to go on to the sciences. Beyond this, they could 
be learned more easily and safely. … because one never learns a foreign language 
as well as one’s own89.
Vernacular languages give access to knowledge that would be 
difficult without many years of instruction and experience. Unlike 
Speroni and Piccolomini, however, Gelli is advocating for the es-
tablishment of the vernacular as a language not only of culture 
but also of politics, in line with the view upheld by Cosimo I in 
the Accademia fiorentina. The Romans did not allow ambassadors 
to be heard in Rome unless they spoke Latin, hence the political 
establishment should run the public affairs of their citizens in a 
similar fashion. As to which the vernacular he is referring to, while 
his specific focus is on Florentine, he is in fact encompassing all 
living languages, because they alone are capable of communicating 
and disseminating knowledge. Only natural language can adequately 
communicate thoughts, and there is no need for refinement because 
«outsiders, through trying too hard to clean it up, spoil it: thus the 
same happens to a language as to a beautiful woman who, thinking 
she is making herself more beautiful, in fact spoils her beauty with 
excessive grooming»90. Gelli here is openly attacking Bembo91, not 
because he wants to promote Florentine, but because he is deeply 
convinced of the value of the vernacular as the natural language of 
culture. The greatness of the vernacular language, which is also its 
beauty, consists in the natural order in which it expresses concepts. 
Such ease and beauty do not exist in Latin, or Latinate vernacular.
This is why Gelli and his immediate predecessors wished for the 
Tuscans to start «translating the sciences into their language»92. Even 
so, Gelli states, many, motivated purely by «accursed jealously», say 
that the vernacular «is neither suitable nor worthy of translating» 
sciences, because «it detracts from their reputation and greatly de-
means them»93. Gelli is therefore pursuing the democratization of 
knowledge, and states that
finding myself recently in the presence of certain literati, one of whom said that 
Bernardo Segni had translated Aristotle’s Rhetoric into vernacular, to which another 
replied that he had performed a great disservice; and when asked why, he said: 
«Because it is not good that every uneducated person should be allowed to know 
what another has acquired over many years with great effort from Greek and Latin 
books»94.
89 Ibidem.
90 Ibidem, p. 200.
91 Ibidem.
92 Ibidem.
93 Ibidem.
94 Ibidem, p. 201.
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These words are, in Gelli’s view, «inappropriate» because the 
main purpose of man is no longer the theoretical aim of gaining 
knowledge by closing himself in an almost monastic pursuit of ideas. 
Man lives in society with other men, and everyone’s duty is to «love 
all and benefit each other, the soul much more than the body, and 
there can be no greater benefit to the soul than to help it to un-
derstand»95. The practical dimension developed by Gelli follows the 
lines set out by Pomponazzi, according to which a properly «human» 
life may be realized only in a society in which man can truly be 
himself. This Aristotelian position is borne out by the structure of 
another of Gelli’s works, La circe, which presents a «civil life» on 
the blueprint of the Nicomachean Ethics96. In order to make the 
understanding and sharing of knowledge easier, everything that is 
written in Greek and Latin should be translated «according to sense 
rather than the words»97. Once again, Gelli attacks Bembo’s attempt 
to codify the vernacular according to rules derived from Latin and 
explicitly states that «wanting to say things in one language with 
the manners of another has no grace at all»98. The first and only 
criterion for establishing the power of the vernacular as a language 
of culture is its capacity to communicate concepts, because «anyone 
who writes does so for no other reason than because his things, 
preserved as letters, which do not disappear like voices, may be un-
derstood by the whole world»99. For this reason, it is best to adopt 
a natural language rather than an artificial one, a language in other 
words that is spoken by everyone, which does not necessarily make 
it uncouth, rather than a language that is simply written. With these 
ideas Gelli goes far beyond Bembo’s project, and much further than 
Speroni and Piccolomini themselves could have hoped.
95 Ibidem.
96 On Aristotelianism in Gelli, Cfr. V. Perrone Compagni, Cose di filosofia si possono dire 
in volgare. Il programma culturale di Giambattista Gelli, in Il volgare come lingua di cultura dal 
Trecento al Cinquecento, cura di A. Calzona, F. P. Fiore, A. Tenenti, C. Vasoli, Firenze, Ol-
schki, 2003, pp. 301-337; M.P. Ellero, Aristotele tra Dante e Petrarca: la ricezione della Poetica 
nelle lezioni di Giambattista Gelli all’Accademia Fiorentina, in «Bruniana & Campanelliana», 
13, 2007, pp. 463-476; A.L. Puliafito, Ostriche e talpe. A proposito della Circe di G.B. Gelli, 
in «Versants. Rivista svizzera delle letterature romanze», 55, 2008, pp. 35-46; A.L. Puliafito, 
Volgarizzamento e propaganda: Giovan Battista Gelli e l’Accademia Fiorentina, in Mecenati, artisti 
e pubblico nel Rinascimento, a cura di L. Secchi Tarugi, Firenze, Cesati, 2011, pp. 383-390; 
A.L. Puliafito, Filosofia, letteratura e vita civile: Giovan Battista Gelli e il volgare, in «Moder-
nidades», 11, 2011, pp. 1-15.
97 G.B. Gelli, Opere, cit., p. 202.
98 Ibidem.
99 Ibidem.
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8. Benedetto Varchi 
The project to establish the vernacular as a language of culture 
was brought to completion by a Florentine intellectual who was 
certainly no friend of Gelli’s. Like Gelli, however, he believes that 
the dignity of the vernacular resides in its expressive capacity, and 
therefore that a language must be judged primarily on the fact that 
it can be spoken and understood. It has been insightfully observed 
that Benedetto Varchi represents «a genuine betrayal of the promises 
of the vernacular Classicism» advanced by Bembo100. It has often 
been assumed that the redesign of Bembo’s project began with a 
reappraisal of spoken Florentine, and that a central theme in Var-
chi’s work was «the connection between the ideas of Bembo on the 
primacy of written language and the authority of the Tuscan vernac-
ular»101. In my view, however, Varchi’s project must be viewed in the 
light of Speroni, Tomitano, and Piccolomini, and of the fact that it 
is not simply posited on a reappraisal of spoken language, but is in 
fact driven by a desire to establish the vernacular as a language of 
culture. 
His most complex work is the treatise Hercolano, dialogo nel qual 
si ragiona generalmente delle lingue e in particolare della fiorentina 
e della Toscana, which was published posthumously in Florence in 
1570. As well as developing a personal theory of the vernacular not 
unlike Speroni and Tomitano’s, it also shows a clear connection with 
Pomponazzian anthropology. Varchi believes that «speech, in other 
words exterior human discourse, is nothing other than manifesting to 
others the concepts of the soul using words»102. By «human» discourse 
he means discourse between men, whereas angels communicate with 
each other and with God through divine discourse103. Discourse may 
be exterior or extrinsic, as opposed to interior or intrinsic, because 
men often speak to themselves within their own minds, such as when 
reasoning, but in so doing they neither speak nor communicate104. 
Speaking is defined by manifesting, that is by expressing and stating 
something to someone, because it is characteristic of men not only to 
speak to themselves, but also to other men105. Analysis of these two 
aspects of human discourse shows that Varchi’s conception is in every 
way similar to Speroni’s, and that the dignity of a language is based 
100 Cfr. F. Bruni, Sistemi critici e strutture narrative (ricerche sulla cultura fiorentina del Ri-
nascimento), Napoli, Liguori, 1969, p. 79; C. Marazzini, Storia della lingua italiana. Il secondo 
Cinquecento e il Seicento, cit., p. 153.
101 C. Marazzini, Storia della lingua italiana. Il secondo Cinquecento e il Seicento, cit., p. 154.
102 B. Varchi, L’Hercolano, a cura di A. Sorella, Pescara, Libreria dell’Università, 1995, p. 
530.
103 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 531.
104 Cfr. Ibidem.
105 Cfr. Ibidem.
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on its capacity to communicate. What is communicated is thought, or 
the «concepts of the soul», because the aim of speech is to reveal to 
the outside world what is in the mind.
Varchi stresses that speech is a specific type of communication 
by means of words, because it is also possible to communicate 
with acts, signs, and gestures, as if they too were instruments for 
signifying things. Words, however, are more suitable for conveying 
thoughts, as well as being specific to man106. It is typical for man 
to speak107. No other creature apart from man can speak, not 
because man, unlike other creatures, has voice, but because only 
man is a social animal108. Clearly for Varchi man’s essence is to be 
a civil animal, or a citizen, and this is why man can speak. Speech 
is not what makes man a civil animal, therefore, otherwise parrots, 
which can imitate the voice of men, could also potentially be citi-
zens109. Man is by nature different from other animals in virtue of 
the fact that he is a social being, and it is only as a social being 
that he can speak. The fact that men are by nature social animals 
and therefore have the capacity to speak, and not that they are so-
cial because they can speak, is an incontrovertible fact for Varchi: 
their capacity to speak comes from nature, and was given to them 
so that they could talk to and be with one another110, and it is this 
social dimension that sets them apart from other animals. Unlike 
other animals, men also know and signify that which is beneficial 
and damaging, useful and harmful, good and bad, beautiful and 
ugly, just unjust and honest; by means of language, in other words, 
they realize their ethical and moral dimension111. Like Pomponazzi, 
therefore, Varchi claims that what sets man apart from other living 
beings is his strictly practical and ethical nature. 
Varchi states that speech is a good that is common and natural 
to all men, but speaking many languages, or speaking one language 
rather than another, is anything but natural112. Hence there is no 
evidence to suggest that men need to learn Latin in order to com-
municate. This is because man does not naturally possess the charac-
teristic of speech, but he does naturally possess the capacity to speak, 
just as laughing is not proper to man, but being able to laugh is113. 
For instance, a child growing up in the desert on his own without 
communicating with anyone would have the capacity to speak with-
106 Cfr. Ibidem.
107 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 534.
108 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 535.
109 Cfr. Ibidem.
110 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 539.
111 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 540.
112 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 542.
113 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 543.
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out actually speaking. He has the capacity to articulate sounds, but 
not to produce discourse. So if it is true that anyone who speaks 
has voice, the opposite is not true114. Speaking for Varchi is clearly 
natural, but it is also clear that speaking in this or that language, or 
in Latin or Greek, with or without rhetoric, depends entirely on cir-
cumstance, study, or will, in other words on factors that are merely 
anthropological, historical, and cultural.
Language is the «speech of one or more peoples who use the 
same words with the same meaning with the same accidents to ex-
press their concepts»115. Language is therefore distinctly characterized 
by a capacity to univocally designate the same concepts with the 
same words. If a concept were expressed with different words, in 
Varchi’s view, there would be grounds for questioning the unity of 
the language. Language is also characterized by being predominantly 
spoken rather than written. Contrary to Bembo, Varchi states that 
writing is not essential to language, but purely accidental, because 
the true nature of language is that it be spoken. Developing the 
innate capacity to speak is difficult enough in his view, so learning 
how to write is even more arduous and unnatural. Hence Varchi 
correctly identifies one of the reasons for the failure of Bembo’s proj-
ect of a vernacular based on the codification of writing. The aim of 
language is communication, and there is no need for it to be written. 
It is sufficient that it be spoken116. A person who speaks wishes to 
open up his soul to a person who listens, and he has no need for 
writing in order to do so, because writing is an artificial instrument 
designed for utility or ornamentation117. Varchi therefore concludes 
that eloquence could be confined to writing, because if the purpose 
of speaking is to manifest concepts, it is sufficient for a speaker to 
be understood and for a listener to understand; oratorial artifice and 
embellishment are not important118.
In Dichiarazione sopra que’ versi del trionfo d’amore therefore, 
using words that closely reflect Speroni’s, Varchi expresses the hope 
that one day all knowledge may be expressed in the vernacular:
 The Latins were followed by the Tuscans, who are able to write in a simple 
manner and with marvellous dexterity pretty much all that they turn their hand 
to. And I for my part have no doubt that in the course of time, despite the 
novelty of the language and the contrariness of the people as much as of the 
times, we shall see all or most of the sciences translated or at least treated very 
satisfactorily in the Tuscan language … nor does it seem to me to be true what 
many, basing themselves on the authority of the ancients, criticize so much, 
114 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 548.
115 Ibidem, p. 635.
116 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 640.
117 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 657.
118 Cfr. Ibidem, p. 636.
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namely that the sciences should not be made manifest and explained to the 
populace … but I say that each and every man of prudence and discernment 
must dedicate himself with all his might to making idiots and vulgar men less 
so as much as possible, and there is no other way than to teach them first the 
virtues, then the sciences119.
For Varchi it is therefore important not only that language trans-
mits knowledge, but also that it be understood by the people, in-
cluding «idiots», or illiterates. Varchi’s linguistic needs are therefore 
met with theoretical and philosophical assumptions that are entirely 
alien to figures such as Bembo, still attached as they are to an aris-
tocratic idea of culture and language. Such a conception of language 
necessarily entailed a reappraisal of the principles of Aristotelianism 
stripped of all Scholastic and Neoplatonic assumptions regarding the 
ideas, or linguistic ideals, as eternal and unchangeable models that 
have to be adhered to in order to provide a definitively codified 
image of the world. With Varchi, Gelli, Piccolomini and Speroni, 
the Cinquecento offers a new model of man characterized according 
to the devices of Aristotelian philosophy. This «new» Aristotelianism 
embraced a mundane and no longer only transcendental view of the 
individual, and this in turn allowed the vernacular to assert itself as 
a language of culture, which is precisely what did not happen after 
Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Alberti, and Lorenzo the Magnificent, 
who all lived in an age that was still heavily influenced by tran-
scendentalism. This «new» Aristotelian perspective gave a powerful 
impetus to the establishment of vernacular as a language of culture, 
a language that was no longer limited to a narrow circle of intellec-
tuals, but open to the people for the people120.
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119 B. Varchi, Opere, Trieste, Lloyd, 1859, vol. II, p. 490.
120 Cfr. L. Bianchi, Volgarizzare Aristotele: per chi?, in «Freiburger Zeitschrift für Phi-
losophie und Theologie», 59, 2012, pp. 480-495; D.A. Lines, Beyond Latin in Renaissance 
Philosophy: A Plea for New Critical Perspectives, in «Intellectual History Review», 25, 2015, 
pp. 373-389; M. Sgarbi, Aristotle and the People, in «Renaissance and Reformation», 39, 2016, 
pp. 59-109.
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language of culture appear to criticize Bembo’s theoretical model, whether directly 
or indirectly, even when there was compliance on a practical level.
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